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I develop and defend a novel answer to Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Special 
Composition Question,’ (SCQ) namely, under what conditions do some 
things compose and object? My answer is that things will compose an ob-
ject when and only when they exist simultaneously relative to a reference 
frame (I call this ‘Temporally Restricted Composition’ or TREC). I then 
show how this view wards off objections given to ‘Unrestricted Mereology’ 
(UM). TREC, unlike other theories of Restricted Composition, does not 
fall prey to worries about vagueness, anthropocentrism, or arbitrariness. 
TREC also has advantages over all the other answers to the SCQ. TREC 
is an account an A-theorist anti-Eternalist who wants an unrestricted 
mereology should accept. I also engage in some conceptual hygiene by 
showing how UM, as it should be used, should not, in itself, entail or 
contain a commitment to either Eternalism or Four-Dimensionalism.
Keywords: Mereology, special composition question, part-whole 
relation, naturalized metaphyics, composition, special relativity 
theory.
Peter Van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question’ (‘SCQ’) asks—
when do some things compose or make up a further thing? (Van In-
wagen 1990: 21–33). The Unrestricted Mereologist answers—’always’. 
(see Rea 2008 and Sider 2001) Some rivals of UM, the Nihilists, an-
swer: ‘never’ (e.g. Rosen and Dorr 2002, Dorr 2005). Organicists say 
composition occurs ‘when the things compose an organism’. (Van In-
wagen 1990, Merricks 2003) According to the folk theory we could call 
‘Intuitivism’ the answer is that composition occurs ‘whenever we intui-
tively think it does.’1 Lastly, the Brutalist answers that composition’s 
obtaining or not is brute and unexplainable (Markosian 1998).
There are serious problems with all of these accounts. No one, to 
my knowledge, has proposed the answer that I will recommend.2 I will 
1 This view is tacitly assumed by many, e.g. Wiggins 1980.
2 There is however, brief discussion of one of the embedded conditionals in 
Hudson 2001. As this is nearing publication, I just noticed the paper by McKenzie 
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argue that the correct answer to the SCQ is what I will call ‘Temporally 
Restricted Composition’, or ‘TREC’ for short. Stated informally it is as 
follows:
(TREC) For any X’s they will compose a fusion F at a time t when and 
only when all of their parts exist simultaneously, relative to a reference 
frame.3
Stated informally without regard to Relativity Theory, we have:
(TREC*) For any X’s they will compose a fusion F when and only when 
the X’s exist simultaneously.
I will argue that TREC is a better answer to the SCQ than the rival 
positions. TREC acknowledges all the composite objects of common-
sense, respects many of the persuasive arguments which support un-
restricted mereology, without incurring ontological commitment to a 
profusion of cross-time fusions. TREC is a non-ad hoc answer to SCQ 
which avoids arbitrariness and anthropocentricism, while also avoid-
ing problems of vagueness.
I will suppose that the fundamental objects/things over which the 
SCQ ranges are either fundamental or simple particles (if there are 
any) or ‘atomless gunk’ portions (if there are any). Events, if there are 
any, would I believe have a different mereological structure than ob-
jects, and when people talk of objects they are not talking of baseball 
games or recessions. At least, this seems presumed in the literature 
on composition, which has sidestepped events (with the exception of 
4d, which one could construe as consolidating the categories of object 
and event). Certainly the literature is largely restricting the discussion 
with SCQ to objects, most likely to its detriment. And it also seems that 
TREC is decidedly not true of events, such as baseball games which 
are composed of nine non-simultaneous innings. So, none of what I say 
about objects will necessarily hold of events.
TREC is inconsistent with Four Dimensionalist accounts which ac-
cept that there are wholes composed of temporally disjoint parts. TREC 
is only consistent with Three-Dimensionalism, which is the doctrine 
that objects persist through time by being ‘wholly present’ at different 
times, rather than by having distinct temporal parts at different times.4 
One of my targets is Unrestricted Mereology, but this is not equivalent 
and Muller 2017, which has some similarities, but based on state boundedness 
rather than simultaneity.
3 Slightly more formally, ∀t∀F∀X:(y:XCyt <=> XEtF), or, for all time’s t, frames 
of reference F, and any X’s, there will exist a y such that the X’s compose y at t if and 
only if the X’s Exist-at-t-relative to F. Thanks to two anonymous referees for some 
helpful comments on TREC.
4 TREC does not strictly speaking entail Three-Dimensionalism, since it is 
consistent with the claim that simples never last more than an instant, according to 
any reference frame. TREC is only Three-Dimensionalist along with this supposition, 
which is a way of assuming Three Dimensionalism. I will suppose that simples can, 
and often do, endure.
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to Four-Dimensionalism. Unrestricted Mereology entails that tempo-
ral parts compose cross-time fusions only if temporal parts exist. One 
could furthermore be a Four-Dimensionalist who has a restriction on 
which temporal parts fuse. I will just assume Three-Dimensionalism, 
and show how TREC gels with a Three-Dimensionalistic picture.
Intuitively, we want there to be a restriction on composition, other-
wise we will have strange objects, composed, for instance, of Alexander 
the Great’s kidney and Tom Cruise’s gall bladder, and another com-
posed of all the salmon and Obama’s great-great grandchildren. But, 
the main arguments against a restriction on composition is that any 
proposed restriction will be either (i) arbitrary or ad hoc, (ii) anthropo-
centric, or (iii) will entail worldly vagueness about what exists (Sider 
2001: 11–74). I will show that TREC succumbs to none of these objec-
tions. Then I will show what benefi ts TREC has, compared to its rivals. 
TREC is not arbitrary. Simultaneity according to a reference frame 
is a signifi cant natural property, which arguably must obtain for any 
causal relations to obtain.5 It is not picked out of the blue to obtain 
certain desired results. It is a non-Presentist acknowledgment of si-
multaneity as crucial in one’s consideration for objects to ‘get together’ 
to make up a further object. Objects which are not on the same hy-
perplane, and are outside of each other’s future and past light cones 
can have no causal interactions. It is intuitive that a composite object’s 
parts can exert some causal infl uence on each other, and act jointly 
(in such a way, for instance, that they can have a center of gravity, 
which cross-time fusions cannot). Supposed fusions which can do none 
of these things seem to lack what it takes to compose an object. How-
ever, objects which do exist simultaneously according to a reference 
frame, such as all those which compose our galaxy, can have causal 
interactions, such as mutual gravitational pull, shared spin-relations 
along an axis or center of gravity, and so on.
Three-Dimensionalists should be suspicious of cross-time fusions. 
Assume that there is a world W with absolute time, and suppose that 
x exists at t1 only, at y at t3 only. The unrestricted mereologist would 
hold that x and y compose a fusion F. But the Three-Dimensionalist, 
especially of the A-theorist variety, should doubt this. When does F 
exist? Not at t2. An object can’t exist at a time when none of its parts 
do. At t1? How could it (the fusion of x and y) exist at t1? Only part of 
it exists then. Y is not even in existence yet, so how could it compose 
something? At t3? How could it be? One of its parts, x, no longer ex-
ists? I do not take this as conclusive, and to solidify this point would 
take us far afi eld of the goals of this article. I merely want to point out 
5 Quantum entanglement phenomena does not cut against this, as entangled 
particles needed to exist simultaneously at some time according to a reference frame 
in order to be entangled, even if the effects of this entanglement could manifest 
after the particles are no longer simultaneous according to any reference frame. C.f. 
McKenzie and Muller 2017.
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how the Three-Dimensionalist Non-Presentist6, who already believes 
in some kind of temporally relativized notion of property-possession 
(such as shapes, which are often held to be disguised relations to times 
by Three-Dimensionalists), has ample reason to believe that parthood 
is temporally relative and has a synchronous requisite as well, if the 
‘present’ in ‘wholly present’ is to have any meaning. TREC does not it-
self entail mereological essentialism (ME), or the doctrine that objects 
have all of their parts essentially, unless we assume that all objects are 
identical with mereological sums, which is questionable. (More on this 
below). But TREC it is consistent with ME, and can be combined with 
standard mereological theses such as uniqueness and extensionality 
which will entail ME. I do think that ME is correct, and while TREC 
helps make sense of and defend it, the truth of TREC does not depend 
on it.7
TREC is not anthropocentric. Even those who believe that time does 
not ‘really’ exist, or believe that the fl ow of time is illusory, still accept, 
if they accept Relativity Theory, that simultaneity according to a refer-
ence frame, light-cone charts, and Minkowski spacetime diagrams, all 
capture important natural joints in the world which are neither psy-
chological nor merely conventional.
While some still believe that reference frames are necessarily de-
fi ned in terms of an observer, most do not, and can defi ne a reference 
frame in terms of a coordinate system. Most believe that Relativity 
phenomenon still occur where no observers are, or could be. If this is 
so, then TREC does not succumb to the anthropocentricism charge on 
this score, either.
TREC does not entail worldly vagueness. One of the strongest argu-
ments against restrictions on composition has been given by Ted Sider 
(2001 chapter 4.9), and now goes by the name of ‘the argument from 
vagueness,’ which is used to support Four Dimensionalism. Briefl y, 
and superfi cially (the argument is quite complicated), the problem, 
supposedly, with any restriction on composition short of Nihilism (the 
doctrine that composition never occurs) is that the restriction will in-
evitably be vague, so that it is indeterminate what fusions there are, 
and hence indeterminate how many things exist, which is impossible.
Take any restriction you like (e.g., falling under a commonsense sor-
tal, being chemically bonded, composing a life, etc.). Sider states that 
for any candidate restriction R captured by conditions C we can create 
a sorites-like series of cases starting from C determinately holding to 
a situation where it is indeterminate whether C obtains, and hence 
whether the fusion in question exists, and hence whether an object ex-
ists, which is impossible (Sider 2001 Ch. 4.9).
6 I take it that Presentism is not compatible with Relativity Theory, and hence 
a Presentist can’t accept TREC*, which denies objective simultaneity. Although, see 
Zimmerman 2011 about how Presentism and RT could be reconciled.
7 See Steen (2016) for a defense of mereological essentialism.
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TREC does not succumb to this objection if synchrony is not conven-
tional. While this issue is somewhat controversial, it is held by many 
that Malament’s Theorem proves the non-conventionality of simulta-
neity according to a reference frame. Torretti says,
Malament proved that simultaneity by standard synchronism in an iner-
tial frame F is the only non-universal equivalence between events at differ-
ent points of F that is defi nable (“in any sense of ‘defi nable’ no matter how 
weak”) in terms of causal connectibility alone, for a given F. (Torretti 1983: 
229)
So, if synchrony is objective, then the argument from vagueness has 
no bite against the TREC theorist. There is no sorites-series of time in-
dexed states of affairs S1...Sn, where, according to S1, it is determinate 
that composition holds in S1, and indeterminate whether composition 
holds for some fi rst S1+n. For any two objects O1 and O2, and for any 
arbitrarily chosen reference frame R, either O1 and O2 exist simulta-
neously according to R or not. If there is no R such that O1 and O2 ex-
ist simultaneously according to it, then there will be no fusion of them 
whatsoever.
If one objects that a fusion F composed out of O1 and O2 will exist 
according to a frame R1, and not according to R2, and hence it is inde-
terminate whether F exists, then one is not thoroughly accepting Rela-
tivity Theory. One would be, against Relativity Theory, privileging one 
frame over another, or, incoherently, attempting to combine a timeless 
notion of parthood with the TREC view that parthood is relative to 
times (which are in turn relative to reference frames). In fact, accord-
ing to TREC, parthood is a four-place relation. There is no parthood 
simpliciter. O1 cannot simply be a part of O2. O1 can only be a part of 
O2 if O1 is a part of O2 at time t, relative to R.
It might be thought strange that there is no frame-independent an-
swer to how many things there are, but this amounts to no more than 
an incredulous stare. There are also no frame-independent answers 
to how long something is, when something occurred, how much time 
passed, and so on. There are also no frame-independent temporal or-
derings of a sequence of events. E1 can occur before E2 according to 
R1, whereas E2 can occur simultaneous with E1 according to R2. If one 
accepts Relativity Theory already, with its concomitant strangeness, 
then the relativity of which composites there are is par for the course.
Lastly, some parting words on why TREC is superior to its rivals. 
TREC has all of the strengths of UM, but lessens the bite of its main 
weakness. UM is supported by arguing against arbitrariness, anthro-
pocentricism, and vagueness in composition. TREC endorses all of 
these arguments, and obeys the same strictures, without entailing a 
bevy of cross-time fusions which can exist even when some or none of 
their parts do (or exist eternally as parts of one thing, even when there 
is no time at which it exists). TREC also blocks the argument from 
vagueness, and gels with Three-Dimensionalism, which has support 
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independent of worries about composition. (There will be more on the 
objection of how the motivation for TREC really serves as a motivation 
for UM below).
TREC is superior to ‘Organicism’, or the view that the only com-
posites are living beings. This is a severely limited view on what com-
posites there are. TREC allows for living beings, as well as buildings, 
tables, and rocks. Organicism can be viewed also as ‘inanimate compos-
ite object nihilism,’ and has severe weaknesses in that ‘causal-redun-
dancy’ and compositional scepticism premises command less credence 
than the proposition they entail the falsity of, namely that there are 
composite non-living objects. Organicism also has the unwelcome con-
sequence of either positing a sharp-line between the living and the non-
living, which doesn’t seem to exist in nature, or supporting that there 
are some vague objects (namely, objects of which it is indeterminate 
whether they are living, and hence indeterminate whether there are 
certain sums).
TREC is superior to Nihilism, or the view that there are no com-
posite entities whatsoever. TREC allows composite objects, which is 
obviously an intuitive desiderata, and is untouched by one of the ma-
jor concerns that motivate Nihilism, namely, concerns about vague-
ness. Also, the Nihilist who rejects extended simples cannot hold that 
there is ‘gunk’, or stuff whose proper parts all have proper parts, ad 
infi nitum.  There can be no gunk, according to the Nihilist who rejects 
extended simples, since  gunk is composite, and the gunk hypothesis 
rules out point particles.8 TREC has no such entailments, and does not 
rule out gunk worlds.
TREC is superior to ‘Brutal Composition,’ or the view that wheth-
er or not composition occurs is just a brute fact with no explanation 
whatsoever (Markosian 1998). Any well-supported explanation is bet-
ter than none, and TREC gives one. Furthermore, this explanation 
goes along with commonsense more than Brutalism, in that Brutal-
ism leaves it mysterious whether there are ordinary composite objects, 
and also allows, in principle (since there is no principle disallowing it) 
that there are bizarre cross-time fusions. The Brutalist rules out Four-
Dimensionalism via the argument from vagueness only by positing a 
brute restriction which, for all we know, rules out all the composite 
Three Dimensional objects the Brutalist was attempting to rescue.
TREC is also superior to the often held, but almost never stated 
view of composition which we could call ‘Intuitivism’. Intuitivism is the 
view that composition occurs whenever we intuitively think it does. 
Intuitivism is also the view held by those who think worrying about the 
Special Composition Question is silly. Such people, rather than think-
ing there is no answer to the SCQ, often believe that there are some 
8 And, the acceptance of extended simples brings along it’s own problems. 
Furthermore, the supposition of there being stuff which is not things which 
composes simples goes against the desired sparseness of the Nihilists view. For work 
on extended simples, see Markosian 1998a and 2004.
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composites (such as themselves, or baseballs) but not others (such as 
the object composed of the Pyramids of Giza and the Bee Gees), but ei-
ther think that there is no principle whatsoever, or the unsatisfactory 
Intuitivist one. This ‘view’, if it can be called one, also succumbs to the 
charges of arbitrariness, anthropocentricity, and vagueness. One can-
not escape the SCQ by refusing to think about it, since, by default, one 
will accept this unacceptable folk view about composition. One might 
attempt to rescue Intuitivism by becoming Aristotelian or neo-Aristo-
telian, and hold that simples compose a sum S just in case there is an 
Aristotelian form F (or substantial form, or rigid embodiment, or domi-
nant sortal, etc. etc.)9 which inheres in the simples. But, if one does 
this, one just reintroduces the worries about anthropocentricity and 
vagueness. Which candidate F’s are actually forms? Can one rule out 
bizarre substantial forms (or whatever substitute you like) and give an 
answer to the SCQ without being slavish to our contingently possessed 
perceptual and cognitive faculties, and interests? Can one hold a view 
like this and rule out vagueness? I hold, with Sider (2001) and Kurtsal 
Steen (2010), that the answer is ‘no’.
A fi nal worry about TREC is that, while it does rule out all cross-
time fusions, that it does allow in many strange ones not countenanced 
by the folk, such as the sum of the paper you are reading and your 
pinky. But, I think the argument from vagueness, while not showing 
that any restriction is nonviable (for I believe of course that TREC is a 
viable restriction), does in fact show that every other presented alter-
native to Unrestricted Mereology and TREC is nonviable. While there 
may be other restrictions which are neither arbitrary, anthropocentric, 
or entail worldly vagueness, I have not seen any. Kurtsal Steen (2010) 
does a good job of showing how, despite appearances, the argument 
from vagueness does not in fact entail four-dimensionalism. So, my em-
ployment of it in arguing against other views and for TREC does not 
commit me to four-dimensionalism either.
But one might think that the TREC is not suffi ciently motivated 
since vagueness, arbitrariness, and anthropocentricity concerns sup-
port UM. TREC still allows in a bevy of odd objects, and faces the same 
objections that UM does. So why not ‘go all the way’ for wholesale UM?
There are several reasons not to. One should ask the following—
Does UM entail Eternalism (the doctrine that all times, past present 
and future are all equally real, there being no privileged ‘now’)? If so, 
then all those reasons to reject Eternalism (e.g free will issues, the 
problem of change, counterintuitiveness, no time fl ow, etc. etc.) apply 
to UM. If not, then UM may in fact be consistent with TREC (e.g., if 
Presentism were true, a UM and TREC would entail the existence of a 
coextensive sets of fusions).
But, if one looks at the literature, and how UM is understood, its 
proponents do in fact seem to believe that UM entails Eternalism or 
9 See, for example, Burke 1994, Fine 1999, and Koslicki 2008.
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has Eternalism as a part of the doctrine.10 But, as I think I have shown, 
one can think that whatever exists has a fusion and yet reject UM, and 
so there is a major distinction between UM’ists and TRECkies. TREC 
is like unrestricted mereology for A-theorists. To the extent that one 
accepts A-theory and the arguments for restricted composition based 
on the worries of arbitrariness etc. then one should accept TREC.
There are other arguments one could give for TREC over UM, such 
as some of the table-pounding one given on page 3. One might also 
say that UM falls prey to ‘double-counting’ in a way that TREC does 
not. Suppose that there are a collection of simples spread around the 
galaxy at t1—call it S1. Now suppose, as a three-dimensionalist would 
say, that the very same collection of simples endures  (no parts go out 
of existence) and is identical with a collection S2 at t2. This seems in-
nocent (to me). The TRECkie would say that S2 is S1 and we have one 
entity. The UM’ist would say that S2 and S1, being distinct entities, 
would compose a fusion S3, which exists atemporally. But this strikes 
me as double-counting.
Or would they accept S3 as a distinct entity? Well, this depends—
does UM entail Four-Dimensionalism, or have Four-Dimensionalism 
as a part of the doctrine? If it does, then those who do not accept Eter-
nalism and Temporal Parts would have reason to reject it, and would 
need to posit some other principle, similar to UM, which does not entail 
these views. (And what would be if not TREC?). If it does not entail 4d, 
then it seems that UM is actually consistent with TREC. But, the way 
the phrase is used, it does in fact seem that UM is a ‘package deal’, 
namely, unrestricted mereology + Eternalism + Four-dimensionalism 
(of the temporal parts variety).
All I have done is merely outline and argue for a modest proposal—
namely, a more narrow theory of unrestricted composition for A-theo-
rist Three-Dimensionalists who accept that restrictions on composition 
are hopeless. By pointing out that the phrase ‘unrestricted mereology’ 
or ‘unrestricted composition’ are misleading, I’ve teased apart several 
features that get run together and laid out how a Three-Dimensionalist 
A-theorist who is moved by the argument from vagueness should think 
about unrestricted composition. Hopefully that might clear up some 
problems in the debates about persistence and time. At the very least, I 
have laid out what a theory of unrestricted composition might look like 
if one accepts, say, the Moving Spotlight, or the Growing Block views 
of time.11
10 See, e.g. Rea’s defi nition (1998: 348), Sider (2001: 120), Koslicki (2008: 74). 
Overall this may be due to the famous dictum of Quine’s where UM and temporal 
parts are uttered in one breath when he states that physical objects are just “the 
material content of any portion of space-time” (Quine 1976: 497).
11 Thanks go to Sandy Berkovski, Andre Gallois, Mark Heller, Kris McDaniel, 
Thomas McKay, and Dean Zimmerman for some of the earliest feedback on some 
of this material, which goes all the way back to my dissertation (2005). I am also 
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